TRANSMISSION // 2611.21262v1
Why Banks May Hold Back Payments
Source published
An abstract-only account of a theoretical preprint in which full repayment can coexist with a self-fulfilling settlement freeze—and why that does not reveal which outcome would occur.

If every bank in a network pays in full, does that show a payment freeze is impossible? A theoretical preprint says not necessarily: banks may hold back otherwise feasible payments to protect themselves against future cash needs, and their decisions can affect one another.
A bank that delays a payment may be protecting its cash rather than being unable to pay. In a network where banks owe one another money, however, one bank’s decision can affect the cash available to others—and how much they want to keep in reserve.
Hicham El Kaissi’s theoretical preprint examines this interaction. As described in its abstract, the model allows a full-repayment equilibrium and a self-fulfilling settlement freeze to coexist under the same balance-sheet fundamentals. In other words, observing full repayment alone does not establish that this outcome is unique or robust.
Why hold back cash?
In the model, a bank may delay a payment it could make in order to insure against a future funding need. Keeping cash has value, while delaying payment incurs a settlement-discipline cost. The bank’s choice weighs these considerations. The abstract describes its optimal reserve as a critical quantile of future liquidity requirements.
The abstract also says the repayment rule nests Eisenberg–Noe maximal feasible clearing exactly. It reports that when a counterparty underpays, this both reduces a bank’s current cash and increases its desired reserves—one route by which payment choices can amplify across the network.
The paper further characterises conditions for coexistence and describes a homogeneous two-bank frontier involving interbank exposure and maximum funding pass-through. The abstract does not provide enough detail to interpret that frontier as a general threshold for real banks. It also describes a two-date accounting rule that distinguishes payment timing from ultimate default.
What the result does—and does not—say
The abstract’s central claim is theoretical equilibrium coexistence, not evidence that a particular banking system is fragile. It does not tell us which outcome would be selected. The author explicitly notes that a conditional best-response adjustment diagnostic does not assign selection probabilities. The existence of multiple possible outcomes is therefore distinct from predicting which one would occur.
This account is based only on the supplied abstract of an arXiv preprint, not an independent examination of the paper’s derivations. The mechanism and findings here are attributed to the abstract; their assumptions and technical support cannot be assessed from the available material. The result offers a theoretical caution: full repayment, by itself, need not show that no alternative settlement outcome is possible.
- banking networks
- interbank payments
- liquidity
- settlement
- payment models
- theoretical economics
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