Who Keeps a Journal’s Reputation When Its Editors Quit?

When an academic journal’s editors resign together, the publisher can retain the title while losing the people behind its scholarly reputation. Whether those people can build a credible replacement is another question—and, according to a new preprint, a crucial source of bargaining power.

In “Owning What Can Quit,” Douglas Cumming of Stevens Institute of Technology examines 57 editorial mass resignations recorded by Retraction Watch between 2015 and October 2026. He combines that material with editorial-tenure histories at 110 economics, finance and accounting journals, plus publication and estimated revenue data. The preprint presents a model and descriptive evidence, not a definitive causal account of journal governance.

The strongest leverage may come before departure

Cumming’s model separates ownership of a journal’s title from the expertise and relationships supplied by its editors. A publisher might want a different editorial policy, such as higher publication volume. Editors can object, stay or leave. Their influence depends partly on how much reputation they could carry to a successor and how difficult that successor would be to establish.

The recorded disputes show a striking pattern: none of the 19 episodes involving an owner-initiated editor replacement ended with the owner reversing that replacement after the board resigned.

Three reversals followed resignations elsewhere in the sample, but all concerned disputed papers rather than editorial appointments. A separate example at the European Law Journal involved a publisher withdrawing an appointment process after board protest in 2018, before the board’s later resignation over contract terms.

Cumming interprets this as evidence that credible threats to leave matter most before departure. It does not establish that resignation can never change an owner’s mind: the sample consists of publicly recorded disputes, and the numerical difference between replacement disputes and other disputes was not statistically significant.

A new journal needs institutional backing

Across the 57 episodes, 25 produced a launched or planned successor. The ownership arrangements mattered.

Among seven publisher-owned journals affiliated with scholarly societies, six had a successor launched or planned. That compares with 17 of 38 publisher-owned titles without a society. Where the society itself owned the original title, only one of eight episodes produced a successor: in those cases, the society’s name and institutional support remained with the existing journal.

The society-affiliation result needs particular caution. Two successors were still only planned. Counting launched journals alone reduces the comparison to four of seven versus 17 of 38, a difference not statistically distinguishable from chance.

Successors were also less common in medicine and life sciences: three of 19 episodes, against 22 of 38 elsewhere. Cumming connects this to the relative scarcity of non-profit hosts in those fields, while acknowledging that indexing practices and disciplinary norms may also matter.

Cheaper hosting did not coincide with a higher successor share after 2023: it remained about 44%. However, non-commercial organizations hosted a larger share of successors with known hosts.

Rankings can keep reputation attached to a name

Cumming argues that journal rankings strengthen owners because they rate titles rather than editorial teams. A departing board’s new journal must establish its own record, while the original retains its rating. For researchers whose careers depend on ranked publications, following respected editors to an unrated journal can therefore be costly.

This is an institutional mechanism proposed by the paper, rather than a separately measured causal effect. Its policy suggestions include provisional ratings for successors and closer scrutiny of journals after collective board departures.

More papers do not necessarily mean greater standing

The preprint also examines Finance Research Letters, whose founding editor’s contract was not renewed in 2014. Cumming, one of three incoming editors, reports being told that a ten-year tenure limit justified the change. Yet 18 of 26 long-serving Elsevier editors in his verified comparison sample remained beyond the 2010–2015 test period. That contradicts a uniformly binding cap; evidence that enforcement specifically targeted weak boards rests on one documented case.

After the transition, Finance Research Letters’ publication volume increased roughly 3.8-fold relative to comparison journals in the study’s 2010–2018 window. Citations per document showed no statistically significant relative change. Output had already doubled in 2014, complicating attribution to the editorial replacement.

Cumming discloses both his participation and a separate dispute with Elsevier. He also reports extensive AI assistance, including initial coding and analysis, which he says he reviewed. The underlying samples are small and unevenly documented, and the resignation list is not a census.

The central argument is consequently narrower than a verdict against editorial replacement: ownership gives publishers formal control, but societies, hosts and evaluation systems help determine whether an editorial community has a credible alternative.